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SYMPOSIUM
STABILITY IN WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS:
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS*
Alan N. Rechtschaffen**
Fordham University School of Law sponsors a class on
Derivatives and Risk Management, which I teach. In this class

we synthesize mathematics, economics, and legal analysis to
demonstrate the regulatory framework in which the derivatives

market operates.
Recent headlines emphasize that the regulatory scheme is
inseparable from the economic nature of these financial risk
management tools. Participants in this market, members of
corporate boards of directors, their counselors and advisors must
begin a learning process on the nature of regulatory responsibility
in this multi-trillion dollar industry. Today we are going to
discuss how that regulatory scheme is affected by the economic
realities of an ever-changing financial marketplace. Through
enhanced understanding of market realities, regulators,
academicians and market participants can work together to
create a more stable world financial marketplace.
Our conference is especially timely. Our global economy is in
1
an exciting period of change. We have a new currency, the Euro.
Perhaps the regulatory structures of the "new Europe" wil
determine the success of that currency. This is a time when the

This introduction was originally presented at the Derivatives and Risk
Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets, held at
Fordham University School of Law on January 28,1999.
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1. See generally Kathy Jones & Alan N. Rechtschaffen, The Euro - Ready
or Not: Trading Implications of the New Common Currency, 22 FoRDHaM
INT'L. L.J. 786 (1999) (discussing the trading and financial implications of the
establishment of the Euro, which became the common currency for eleven
European nations as of January 1, 1999).
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price of Yahoo! and the internet stocks has become as important
as the price of the Thai Baht and the Brazilian Real.
Today we are going to talk about new market developments,
new opportunities, and new market risks. The history of the law
of derivatives and risk management is a story of headlines,
scandals, and rogue traders. Recently, regulatory excitement

surrounded a hedge fund called Long-Term Capital Management
("LTCM").

The story of LTCM and the steps taken by those

involved to insure a well-functioning financial market will set the
stage for tomorrow's regulation. Several of the guests at today's
2. On September 23, 1998, with the encouragement of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, fifteen major banks injected $3.625 billion into
Long-Term Capital Management, L.P. [hereinafter LTCM], a private
investment fund engaged in highly leveraged securities transactions based on
advanced mathematical models, to prevent its collapse and potential default
on an estimated $125 billion it had borrowed on $2.2 billion in capital. See
Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A Hedge Fund Falters,so
the Fed PersuadesBig Banks to Ante Up; Firms to Lend $3.6 Billion as LongTerm Capital Loses on its Bond Bets, WALL ST. J., Sep. 24, 1998 at Al
(reporting on an "extraordinary gathering" in which the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York persuaded large banks to invest over $3.5 billion in LTCM
in return for a 90% ownership stake, and to prevent a financial crisis should it
unwind its positions); Steven Mufson, What Went Wrong? Fund's Big Bettors
Learned that Risk Trumps Math, History, WASH. POST, Sep. 27, 1998, at Hi
(corrected Sep. 29, 1998) (listing fourteen major banks and institutions which
invested a total of $3.6 billion); Steven Syre, Fleet, BankBoston in Syndicate
Backing Troubled Hedge Fund,BosToN GLOBE, Sep. 26, 1998, at F1 (reporting
that Fleet Financial Group had loaned $25 million to LTCM as part of the
bail-out); Joseph Kahn & Peter Truell, Troubled Investment Fund's Bets Now
Estimated at $1.25 Trillion, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 26, 1998, at Al (citing financiers'
estimates that LTCM had leveraged borrowings of $125 billion into $1.25
trillion in open trading positions). The LTCM crisis led to increased public
and governmental scrutiny of hedge funds, including congressional hearings.
See, e.g., Hedge Fund Operations:Hearing Before House Comm. on Banking
and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 1 (1998) (opening statement of Rep. Leach)

(stating that a failure on the magnitude of LTCM's and the Federal Reserve

Bank's intervention "raise profound public policy questions ...."). For
comprehensive information on LTCM's background and near-collapse, see
Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked; N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, § 6, at
24; Carol J. Loomis, A House Built on Sand, FoRTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 110;
Michael Siconolfi, Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, All Bets are Off: How
the Salesmanship and BrainpowerFailed at Long-Term Capital; WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16,1998, at Al.
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symposium participated in a direct and meaningful way in the
story of LTCM. Today we will discuss, among other topics, what
events like the near-collapse of LTCM may mean for long-term
regulation.
New regulatory schemes will have broad effects on our world
financial markets. Recently, the heads of major banks and
market participants met in New York to discuss self-regulatory
initiatives for the derivatives market place.' This reaction to the
recent market headlines reminds me of something Thomas Paine
said: "[P]anics, in some cases have their uses; they produce as
much good as hurt. Their duration is always short; the mind soon
grows through them and acquires a firmer habit than before."'
We are here to discuss new solutions. Hints as to the future
of market regulatory momentum may be revealed in today's
proceedings. The participants at the Fordham Derivatives and
Risk Management Symposium will help guide market
participants, readers, regulators, directors and officers in their
participation in the global economy.
Our economy is strong. The stock market in America may
get stronger, with increasing technological innovations and low
interest rates. The economy may be on the verge of the greatest
revolution since the turn of the last century by virtue of the speed
of information flow, the miniaturization of goods, and the
globalization of the world economy. Today's symposium will
give us insight into the past, and foresight into the future of our
global markets and the world economies.

3. This meeting resulted in the formation of the Counterparty Risk
Management Policy Group [hereinafter CRMIPG], which issued a report in
June 1999 on counterparty credit and market risk management. CRMPG,
IMPROVING CoUNTERPARTY RiSK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (1999) (on file with
the FordhamFinance,Securities, and Tax Law Forum).
4. THOMAS PAINE, The American Crisis No. 1, in COMMON SENSE, THE
RIGHTS OF MAN, AND OTHER EssENTAL. WRmNGS OF THOMAS PAINE 75, 76

(Meridian 1984) (1776).
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